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Russia’s position and intentions regarding the settlement of the situation in the Chechen Re-
public (or “Republic”) are transparent and based on principle. We have nothing to hide. First, I
will cover some points regarding the genesis of the tragic chain of events in and around Chechnya.
The essay then discusses the merits of the antiterrorist operation in response to the 1999 mutiny of
Chechen terrorists.
HUMANITARIAN AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF
THE CRISIS IN CHECHNYA
Yuri V. Ushakov*
Russia's position and intentions regarding the settlement of
the situation in the Chechen Republic (or "Republic") are trans-
parent and based on principle. We have nothing to hide. First, I
will cover some points regarding the genesis of the tragic chain
of events in and around Chechnya.
Chechnya's socioeconomic and criminal situation seriously
deteriorated in the late 1980s to the early 1990s, due to a
number of factors. It is well known, for instance, that attempts
by the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR") leader-
ship to reform the economy and improve its efficiency were not
successful in all areas. These problems shaped the background
that produced many social problems, not just in Chechnya. In-
deed, the federal authorities had relaxed attention to
Chechnya's problems. These problems, however, accumulated
along with the centrifugal sentiments of a certain part of the
population. This destructive energy began to look for some real-
ization, turning Chechnya into a seat of crime.
All these negative developments were considerably strength-
ened by Dzhokar Dudayev's seizure of power. Dudayev consoli-
dated and led the most extremist, nationalist groupings in
Chechnya. In implementing his criminal plan in August 1991,
Dudayev seized the premises of the republican television center
in Grozny, as well as those of the Supreme Soviet and the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. On September
6, 1991, Dudayev's supporters burst into the House of Political
Education in Grozny, where a session of the Supreme Soviet of
the Republic was held, in order to terminate its activities. They
attacked and beat the legally elected Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet, Doku Zavgayev.
Desirous to legitimize his power, Dudayev violated Articles
70, 72, 81, 131, and 131-1 of the Russian Constitution on Octo-
ber 27, 1991, in the conditions of a coup d'etat, masked as elec-
tions of the President and the Supreme Soviet of the so-called
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Chechen Republic of Itchkeria. Dudayev continued to alienate
the Russian Federation territorially and economically by refusing
to sign the Treaty of Federation. Furthermore, he undertook
unilateral actions aimed at withdrawing the Chechen Republic
from the Russian Federation. For instance, Dudayev ordered his
supporters to destroy the referendum on the status of the
Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation in 1993.
In spite of the fact that the creation of armed forces is an
exclusive prerogative of the Russian Federation, Dudayev cre-
ated illegal military units in Chechnya, unlawfully acquiring arms
and ammunition for them. In order to retain power illegally,
Dudayev used such units to organize, as of December 1994,
armed resistance to the federal forces and personnel of the Min-
istry of the Interior and the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service
of the Russian Federation who were restoring constitutional or-
der in the Chechen Republic. These illegal military units caused
the loss of many human lives.
The conclusion of the Khasavyurt Agreements on August
31, 1996, and the election of Aslan Maskhadov to the post of
President of the Chechen Republic in February 1997, opened up
an opportunity to form a legal basis for relations between the
Russian Federation and Chechnya, and to restore law and order
in the Republic. The federal authorities were ready to seize this
opportunity in spite of the doubtful legitimacy of Maskhadov,
who had not been elected in accordance with Russian law.
Instead of directing the emerging process of crisis settle-
ment into a constitutional channel, however, the authorities of
the Chechen Republic preferred to take a different course. The
Chechen Republic turned into an enclave managed by terrorists
and drug and arms traffickers. Additionally, Sharian law was in-
troduced in the Republic in February 1999 through Maskhadov's
decrees. Consequently, all legislation was to be based on the Ko-
ran and Sharian norms, which contradicts the Khasavyurt Agree-
ment's provision on "protecting without reservation the human
and citizens' rights and freedoms without any discrimination by
nationality, religion, residence or other criteria, and suppressing
acts of violence against political opponents, guided by the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of 1949 and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966."
On May 16, 1996, the President of the Russian Federation
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issued a decree introducing a moratorium on the execution of
death sentences. Since then, no death sentence has been exe-
cuted in Russia. Moreover, with its ruling of February 2, 1999,
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation actually sus-
pended the delivery of death sentences in Russia. On August 6,
1999, the Government of the Russian Federation submitted to
the State Duma of the Federal Assembly the Protocol No. 6 to
the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the ab-
olition of the death penalty for ratification. In the context of
such efforts, the Chechen decision to introduce capital punish-
ment on the basis of Shariah was perceived as a challenge to the
whole constitutional and legal system of the Russian Federation.
Public executions on the order of Sharian courts have caused
indignation and revolt among the Russian public.
The Sharian norms are reverting modern society to a system
of barbaric penalties, such as mutilation by cutting fingers and
limbs even for minor crimes. These punishments grossly violate
not only the European Convention on Human Rights but also
the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and De-
grading Treatment. These "innovations" received an extremely
negative response from reputable international organizations.
These organizations recognized that the actions of the Chechen
authorities grossly violated the Convention on Protection of
Human Rights and Basic Freedoms of November 4, 1950 with its
Protocols (Articles 3, 4), which stipulates that no one should be
exposed to torture or degrading treatment or punishment and
that "no one should live in slavery or forced environment."
After Maskhadov signed the decrees introducing a new con-
stitution based on Sharian norms on February 4, 1999, Lord Rus-
sell-Johnston, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe (or "PACE"), urged all the interested parties
to ensure that the new legislation of Chechnya was consistent
with the norms of the Council of Europe He also condemned
public executions in Chechnya by qualifying them as barbaric
acts and flagrant violations of human rights. Having recalled
that the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights apply to all constituent enti-
ties of the Russian Federation, the President of the PACE called
1. See Press Release CE 70b99 (Feb. 4, 1999).
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on Maskhadov to stop those barbaric practices.2
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
("OSCE") Assistance Group to Chechnya (or "Assistance
Group"), which was mandated to promote respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and to identify their violations,
began its activities in April 1995.' In one of its reports, the
Assistance Group stated that the introduction of Sharian law
contravened the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Sharian system
also led to human rights violations, especially in its discrimina-
tory practice against the political rights of non-Muslims.4
The Assistance Group also analyzed the so-called Chechen
Criminal Code (or "Code"), and demonstrated that it grossly vio-
lated OSCE human rights standards.' These violations con-
cerned both institutional and individual rights. Indeed, the
Assistance Group's reports showed that the deprivation of rights
was common practice in Chechnya. Abductions, murders, and
provocative attacks on Russian law enforcement and on the
neighboring North Caucasian populations turned Chechnya
into a hotbed of crime and terrorism and stirred up anger in
Russia at the lawlessness which ruled Chechnya.
Taking hostages, including foreign nationals, became a
common policy of the criminal Chechen authorities. According
to the Ministry of the Interior, by the end of 1999 the number of
hostages had totaled 506 persons, including fifty-three women,
eighteen children, and foreign nationals from six countries. In
1991-1999, 46,000 people were abducted and enslaved. The
sixty-two gangs that engaged in this "business" totaled 2500
members.
Along with crimes against individuals, the illegal armed
groups committed a number of economic crimes, including the
2. See Press Release CE 152b99 (Mar. 12, 1999).
3. See Paul Martin, Regional Efforts of Preventative Measures: Four Case Studies on the
Development of Conflict-Prevention Capabilities, 30 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 881, 902 (1998)
(explaining that Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent
Council allowed an Assistance Group to travel to Chechnya to monitor human rights
violations).
4. Background Report: Human Rights Violations in the Sharian System (Nov. 4,
1999).
5. Background Report: Human Rights Violations in the Chechen Criminal Code
(Nov. 13, 1999).
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production and circulation of counterfeit U.S. currency.6 In the
second half of 1998, many Chechen attempts to launder coun-
terfeit money through Russian financial and banking institutions
were aborted in the remote areas of the Far East, Siberia, and
the Volga region. By the fourth quarter of 1999, over
US$1,000,000 in counterfeit money was withdrawn from illegal
circulation in the Primorsky territory of the Russian Federation
and about US$100,000 in counterfeit money was seized in the
Magadan region (all of them in US$100 notes of the 1996 se-
ries). Both Russian rubles and U.S. dollars of Chechen origin
were registered in 1998-1999 in many constituent entities of the
Russian Federation, in particular in the Amur, Ivanovo, the Re-
public of Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Moscow and Tyumen regions,
and Vologda.
The Chechen territory has also become a manufacturer of
illegal drugs. So far, three heroin producing factories have been
identified in the settlement of Kalinin in the suburbs of Grozny,
the Energetik sanatorium in the district of Shali (controlled by
Shamil Basayev), and in the Zorka children's camp (controlled
by international terrorist Khattab). Moreover, Chechnya has be-
come a channel of drug transit from Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan,
Turkey, and Turkmenistan to the Baltic States, Great Britain,
Spain, and other European states.
In a recent interview with the BBC, acting President Vladi-
mir Putin stressed that since 1996, Chechnya defacto enjoyed full
state sovereignty. In the end, however, the country ended up
virtually divided by the extremist forces into small separate terri-
tories. Each of them was operated (unconstitutionally and law-
lessly) by its respective leader-the so-called field commander.
These field commanders (in essence, gang leaders) assumed
control over lives of a small people living in a rather compact
area. The area was then further exploited by the extremists who
were supported from abroad with weapons, money, and merce-
naries. As a result, life was getting unbearable for the majority of
Chechnya's population. It was no coincidence that 220,000 Rus-
sians and 550,000-600,000 Chechens have left the Chechen re-
6. One could place an advance order for forged notes in Chechnya. According to
the available information, they were fabricated both in the Chechen Republic (in
Argun and Grozny) and outside Russia and were subsequently smuggled in from neigh-
boring states.
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public during these years. They have voted with their legs by
fleeing from the criminal regime.
By the end of the 1990s, the Chechen territory virtually be-
came an outpost of religious extremism and terrorism, directed
not only against Russia but also other countries as well. Numer-
ous documented data, including evidence provided by Russian
citizens detained by the federal forces for organizing terrorist
acts in the North Caucasus region, unequivocally testified to the
existence of a whole network of terrorist training camps-Khat-
tab's schools-within the Chechen Republic. They were located
in many settlements and their suburbs, in particular in Avruti,
Grozny, and Urus-Martan, in the settlements of Serzhen-Yurt,
and a number of others. Emissaries of illegal armed groups op-
erated in Russia, recruiting volunteers to undergo training in
Khattab's field camps in Chechnya. A ramified and well hushed-
up network of sherpas helped to transport Russian citizens to
Chechen camps in 1996-1997. Following a four-month special
training in military camps, they returned to their former places
of residence and joined those who propagated the so-called pure
Islam and Jihad against infidels as well as recruiters and sherpas
for Chechen terrorist training centers. In 1998-1999, we regis-
tered an unprecedented intensification of these efforts. Indeed,
it has been proven that some international terrorists, including
Georgian citizen Nugzar Chukhua, who aided in the assassina-
tion attempt on Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in
February 1998, were also trained in Khattab's camp in Chechnya
in 1997.
On August 1, 1999, illegal armed groups led by Basayev and
Khattab raised a revolt against Daghestan, a neighboring constit-
uent entity of the Russian Federation. Thereafter, on August 10,
1999, the so-called Islamic Shura, which convened at the urging
of Basayev and Khattab in the Botlikh district, declared Daghes-
tan's secession from Russia and the beginning of a holy war
against "invaders." The Shura also adopted an appeal to the Is-
lamic Chechen state and people, calling for the support of Da-
ghestan's Muslims. Later, Basayev became an official head of the
armed forces of the Islamic Shura. He assumed the responsibili-
ties of a military Amir of the joint forces of Daghestan's
mojaheddins until a complete expulsion of Kaffirs (infidels)
from the sacred land of Daghestan.
Federal forces vigorously suppressed the mutiny of Chechen
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terrorists with the support of local residents, who formed a
25,000-strong volunteer corps, and with the help of the authori-
ties of Daghestan. The people of Daghestan clearly confirmed
their intention to live within the Russian Federation. They re-
jected the attempts of the extremists, who used Islamic slogans as
a cover, but who in reality violated the fundamentals of their
religion by imposing their will and rule on Daghestan.
The illegal armed criminal forces that took power in the
Chechen Republic organized and carried out acts of terrorism in
other constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The latest
acts of terrorism resulting in mass human casualties (over 1500)
featured the explosions of apartment houses in autumn 1999 in
Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk. The facts established by
the criminal proceedings instituted in connection with those ex-
plosions testify to the involvement of Chechnya's illegal armed
group field commanders, primarily Basayev, Khattab, and
Salman Raduyev. Indeed, Interpol issued a warrant for their
arrest. During the investigation, the organizers and direct per-
petrators of the said acts of terrorism-Achemes Gochiyayev, De-
nis Saitakov, and others-were identified and put on both na-
tional and international wanted lists. They had been recruited
by an emissary of Khattab, at whose military camps they under-
went special sabotage and combat training, after which they took
part in combat actions against the federal forces. Having exe-
cuted the acts of terrorism, the principal organizers and perpe-
trators entered the Chechen Republic using forged documents.
During the whole period since the signing of the said
Khasavyurt Agreements, the federal authorities patiently worked
for its implementation and sought every opportunity to restore
law and order in the Chechen Republic by peaceful means. In
1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with Maskhadov in
Moscow. In 1998, the then-head of the Russian government,
Yevgueny Primakov, met with Maskhadov in Vladikavkaz.
Maskhadov was repeatedly invited to disassociate himself from
criminal structures and terrorist elements, and to take steps to
stop their illegal activities; he was unwilling to do so. The situa-
tion in Chechnya continued to deteriorate.
When launching the antiterrorist operation, the federal au-
thorities proceeded under the direction of the Vienna Declara-
tion and the Program of Action ofJune 25, 1993 (Paragraph 17)
which declares that
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acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations as well as its ties in certain countries with ille-
gal drug traffickers are the activities aimed at termination of
human rights, basic freedoms and democracy and pose a
threat to territorial integrity and security of countries while
destabilizing legitimate governments.
Indeed, the federal antiterrorist forces in the Chechen Republic
began operation immediately only after an attack by illegal
armed groups on Daghestan, and acts of terrorism in Moscow
and a number of other Russian cities. The decision to conduct
the operation was taken under the real threat to the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation, especially to the lives and
safety of its citizens. The operation fully conformed with the
Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security
adopted by the 1994 OSCE summit in Budapest. Paragraph 6 of
this document directly states that the participating states "will
take appropriate measures to prevent and combat terrorism in
all its forms," while paragraph 25 explains that "the participating
states will not tolerate or support forces that are not accountable
to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities."
Moreover, in trying to settle the ongoing crisis in the Chechen
Republic, the Russian Federation assumed that an armed fight
with Chechen terrorist groups should occur at minimum cost to
the Chechen populace.
On December 13, 1999, the State Duma of the Federal As-
sembly of the Russian Federation adopted a Resolution on Am-
nesty for persons who committed socially dangerous acts in the
course of antiterrorist operations in the North Caucasus. More-
over, the State Duma adopted a resolution on an amnesty appli-
cation. The Resolution on Amnesty applied to persons who
committed illegal acts in Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia,
North Ossetia-Alania, and Stavropol territory since August 1,
1999. Amnesty was also granted to those who ceased armed
resistance and surrendered weapons and military equipment by
midnight February 1, 2000.
The so-called amnesty decree signed by Maskhadov could
be cited for comparison. The decree operates against residents
of the Chechen Republic involved in the restoration of constitu-
tional order. Chechens suspected of cooperating with the lawful
authorities of the Russian Federation are sentenced to death
without limitations. Among those slated for prosecution is the
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Mufti of Chechnya, Alexey Kadyrov, whom Maskhadov branded
a "No. 1 enemy to be executed" after he spoke out against the
meaningless confrontation with the federal authorities. This
outrageous order aroused deep indignation among all Muslims
of the Russian Federation.
Federal troops in Chechnya were not confronted by sepa-
rate terrorist groups but by a well-armed and trained army of
some 25,000 men (including up to 2000 foreign mercenaries).
They were equipped with twenty-eight battle tanks, sixty-one ar-
mored personnel carriers and armored infantry vehicles, four-
teen anti-aircraft guns, a battery of Grad multiple launch rocket
systems, twenty 152-mm guns and 120-mm mortars, a considera-
ble number of 82-mm mortars, hand-held anti-tank grenade
launchers, anti-tank missiles, man-portable air defense systems,
various types of small arms, and a satellite communications sys-
tem. It is quite evident that classic secret service methods could
not be employed to conduct a special operation against such a
large number of armed fighters. The situation required a large-
scale police operation with the involvement of a military contin-
gent.
The antiterrorist operation in Chechnya was not aimed
against the civilian population; its ultimate objective was to pro-
tect innocent lives from terrorist atrocities. The military force
employed in the operation was commensurate with the scale of
the threat. The units engaged were ordered to spare human set-
tlements in order to protect the civilian population, and to de-
liver strikes solely against armed militants, their positions, de-
pots, and strongholds. Above all else, the antiterrorist forces
were to avoid damage to civilian population and facilities. Ac-
cordingly, the federal forces undertook all necessary measures to
liberate human settlements without assaults or other massive ac-
tions, with no casualties or destruction and on the basis of agree-
ments with representatives of the population. In this way, four
out of six cities and more than half of 122 human settlements
were liberated, including Achkhoi-Martan and Gudermes.
Whenever militant formations actively resisted, special security
corridors were erected for the civilian population to leave the
area. All civilians who fled the hostile areas were granted access
to safe districts, temporary accommodations, health care, and
food. Federal personnel received systematic legal training
aimed at developing a humane attitude towards the civilian pop-
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ulation, regardless of nationality or religious beliefs. Further-
more, the military prosecutor's office, which supervises the ob-
servance of internal law and order, has initiated 129 criminal
cases since the beginning of the antiterrorist operation.
There are no "filtration camps" in the Chechen region. Dis-
placed persons are searched only to identify terrorists and find
weapons while passing through the checkpoints. These meas-
ures are necessary to ensure security with reasonable sufficiency.
Naturally, in conducting a military operation of such a scale, cas-
ualties among the civilian population cannot be fully avoided.
This, incidentally, is the goal of the militants' tactics who deploy
heavy armaments within human settlements, quite often near
kindergartens, schools, and hospitals. The actual civilian casual-
ties are, nevertheless, not massive. All possible measures were
taken to reduce them to a minimum. In difficult cases of fight-
ing within human settlements, the federal troops displayed pa-
tience and restraint, and gradually uncovered and captured the
bandits. This tactic is one of the reasons why the antiterrorist
operation in Chechnya has taken so long. The illegal armed
groups are waging a large-scale misinformation campaign
among the public as to the nature of their activities, actions of
the Russian troops, casualties, and destruction. Not only have
these groups established special structures to produce and dis-
tribute video and audio propaganda and other materials, but
they have also utilized over 100 Internet sites provided by inter-
national terrorist and extremist organizations to spread misinfor-
mation.
As a result of the antiterrorist activities, a mass exodus from
the Chechen Republic began in mid-September of 1999. As of
December 20, 1999, 267,600 people from the Chechen Republic
were registered under Form No. 7 ("Registration of Families Ar-
riving in an Emergency Situation") by the migration services of
the Republic of Daghestan, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Re-
public of North Ossetia-Alania, and the Stavropol territory of the
Russian Federation. Seven hundred sixty people were sent to
the temporary accommodation centers of the Russian Family Mi-
gration Service, and 37,700 left for relatives and friends in other
regions of Russia for permanent or temporary stay.
Despite the difficult humanitarian situation, there is no hu-
manitarian catastrophe in the region, which was confirmed by a
number of international delegations that visited the region, as
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well as by Ms. Sadako Ogata, the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees. Indeed, to support the everyday life of people who
left the Chechen Republic and who settled in the territory of the
Republic of Ingushetia, the Russian authorities supplied over
9000 tons of foodstuffs, medical items, and other forms of hu-
manitarian assistance.
The system of humanitarian aid distribution is functioning
within a well-organized mechanism. To minimize possible
losses, its delivery is strictly controlled along the entire chain
from donor to beneficiary. The humanitarian component of
the operation is coordinated by the Ministry for Emergencies
and the Federal Migration Service of Russia.
As a result of the antiterrorist operation, almost the whole
territory of Chechnya was cleared of bandit groups by mid-
March. The military stage of the operation is drawing to a close,
to be followed by political settlement on the basis of strict re-
spect for the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In the lib-
erated areas of the Chechen Republic, measures to ensure law
and order are currently in full swing. In November 1999, a pro-
visional acting Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic was ap-
pointed, ensuring the immediate development of a prosecution
body. Russia's Ministry of Interior developed local interior divi-
sions and investigation bodies involving local officers of previ-
ously operating Interior Ministry bodies. Once all the personnel
are selected, local residents will appoint heads of district admin-
istrations and settlements.
Upon decision by the Government of Russia, more than 102
million rubles of budget appropriations have been allocated for
the restoration of the social and economic infrastructure of the
Chechen Republic in the 1999 fiscal year. The sum is divided in
the following way: government benefits to citizens with chil-
dren-11.2 million rubles; salaries to educational personnel-l10
million rubles; health personnel-4.1 million rubles; procure-
ment of medicines-4.1 million rubles; medical equipment-26
million rubles; purchase of ambulances-2 million rubles; main-
tenance of health care facilities-30 million rubles. Further, 12
million rubles are earmarked to executive authorities of the
Chechen Republic and district administration. Finally, the Rus-
sian Government has allocated 3 billion rubles for restoration of
Chechnya in 2000.
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Peaceful life has been restored in the Chechen settlements
that have been liberated from bandits. Schools are opening
again for the first time over the last three years (forty-six schools
out of sixty-seven are already gaining enrollment). Some enter-
prises have started to operate and heating is being restored.7
The engineer units of the federal troops have started clearing
minefields and restoring oil pipelines in the settlement of Tol-
stoy-Yurt of the Republic's Grozny district. The Ministry of Rail-
ways of Russia has resumed regular cargo traffic to the
Gudermes railway station.
In alleviating the humanitarian situation in the Northern
Caucasus, the Russian side has demonstrated a maximum open-
ness and willingness for dialogue with international organiza-
tions. Several international delegations visited the region during
October 1999-March 2000, including the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the
Council of Europe, Alvaro Gil-Robles, and the OSCE Chairman-
in-Office, Knut Vollebaek.
At present, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(or "ICRC"), the International Federation of the Red Cross, and
the Red Crescent Societies together with the Russian Red Cross
Society are implementing programs of humanitarian and medi-
cal assistance to internally displaced persons (or "IDPs") in the
North Caucasus region. The International Red Cross Movement
has requested 18 million Swiss francs (about US$12 million) for
these purposes from the governments and donor organizations.
In Ingushetia, the ICRC helped to equip five hospitals. It
also financed daily bread provisions to 30,000 IDPs and helped
to prepare several thousand hot meals. Similar assistance was
provided to 30,000 IDPs in Chechnya and 20,000 IDPs in the
neighboring constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The
European Bureau of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees is, in general, satisfied with the progress of the U.N.
humanitarian operation in the North Caucasus and the level of
cooperation with the Russian authorities. Russia has repeatedly
confirmed and confirms once again its willingness to ensure nec-
essary conditions for the operation of international organiza-
tions providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced
7. On the whole, power supply has been provided to 70 out of 100 settlements
liberated by the Federal troops, and gas has been supplied to 67 settlements.
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persons. The safe delivery and distribution of such humanita-
rian aid will be arranged through federal channels existing in
Russia with proper provisions for the safety of international mon-
itoring personnel.
Upon completion of the large-scale antiterrorist part of the
operation of the federal forces, the antiterrorist activities will
proceed in a more discrete fashion, albeit in a manner that is
accepted, adopted, and globally implemented. The next step
will be the "passportization" of the Republic's population, in-
cluding returnees. Then we plan to hold elections in a peaceful
and democratic atmosphere, and to replace the appointed au-
thorities with the elected ones. The elections will be followed by
discussions with the newly elected government of Chechnya on
the status of the Republic within the Russian Federation. That
will be the final stage of the peace process. Furthermore, while
in the process of post-conflict rehabilitation and restoration of
democratic institutions and human rights in the Chechen Re-
public, Russia will openly cooperate with all competent interna-
tional organizations, including, first of all, the United Nations,
OSCE, and the Council of Europe.
Finally, I would emphasize some overall views relevant for
the issue covered above. The antiterrorist operation was con-
ducted in full compliance with Russia's international obliga-
tions.8 Further, the actions of the Russian authorities during the
antiterrorist operation in Chechnya were based on Russian legis-
lation. The Federal Law on Defense of 1996 defines defense as a
"system of political, economic, military, social, legal and other
measures to prepare for armed protection and the armed pro-
tection of the Russian Federation as well as the integrity and invi-
olability of its territory" and determines the scope of powers
available to the state authorities in case of need. In addition, the
Federal Law on Combating Terrorism of 1998 established a de-
tailed list of measures which authorities can take to suppress ter-
8. Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the possi-
bility of derogation by a state from its obligations under this convention "in time of war
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation." Article 15 stipulates that
its provisions cannot be invoked with a view to derogating from Article 2, which guaran-
tees the right to life, "except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war." In
accordance with Article 2, deprivation of life is not regarded as inflicted in contraven-
tion of that Article "when it results from the use of force which is no more than abso-
lutely necessary," including "in defense of any person from unlawful violence" and "in
action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection."
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rorist activities. The Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation of July 31, 1995 points out that the Constitu-
tion of Russia "does not presuppose that in extraordinary situa-
tions state integrity and constitutional order can be ensured ex-
clusively through the declaration of state of emergency or impo-
sition of martial law." The same Ruling of the Constitutional
Court states that the "international treaties to which the Russian
Federation is a party and which, in accordance with Article 15, 4
of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, are an integral
part of its legal system also proceed from the possibility of using
the Armed Forces for protection of the national unity and terri-
torial integrity of the state." In terms of its basic provisions, the
Ruling of the Constitutional Court is also applicable to the cur-
rent developments in the Chechen Republic. Thus, measures
taken by the federal authorities in conducting the anti-terrorist
operation in Chechnya were fully compatible not only with the
European Convention on Human Rights but also with other ob-
ligations of the Russian Federation under international law, in-
cluding international humanitarian law.
National accord among Russians on the fundamental as-
pects of Chechnya settlement requires the federal authorities to
eliminate, at last, the hotbed of terror and lawlessness in the
Chechen Republic and to recreate conditions necessary for the
stable and prosperous development of that territory and the re-
gion as a whole. The power component of the antiterrorist oper-
ation was applied lawfully under an efficient state and-ciil con-
trol in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, laws,
and regulations of the Russian Federation, and in compliance
with Russia's international legal obligations. In sum, the promo-
tion of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution of
the Russian Federation and European Convention on Human
Rights for the benefit of the Russian citizenry, including the
Chechen Republic, is one of the means to achieve the final ob-
jective-an opportunity for everyone to enjoy the benefits and
achievements of modern society, and to be a citizen of a truly
democratic rule-of-law state.
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